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Abstract 
Faced with widespread prejudice and discrimination, European Muslims are 
increasingly resorting to the European Court of Human Rights as a last-ditch strategy to 
transform state policies toward minority faiths. While the Court has a mandate to 
protect religious freedom and equality, the conservative and sometimes biased way in 
which it has interpreted these concepts has enabled the persistence of stark asymmetries 
in the legal and social status of different religions. Based on an analysis of relevant 
cases, this article seeks to highlight the judicial processes that currently sustain Muslim 
subordination and pinpoint specific reforms that could reverse the trend. 
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Despite the prohibition of religious discrimination enshrined in two European Union 
directives covering the fields of employment, hate crime and hate speech,1 sociological 
studies show that Muslims living in majority Christian European countries still face 
multiple forms of unfavourable treatment. In a large-scale survey conducted by the 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 11% of Muslim respondents reported 
having suffered faith-based attacks, threats or harassment during the previous year. 2 
Another study, based on secondary sources, identified hundreds of acts of vandalism on 
Muslim mosques, graves, butcheries and other property, as well as discriminatory 
employment practices, physical assaults, verbal abuse and hostile tracts, websites and 
letters.3 Consistent with these findings, recent Muslim immigrants have been found to 
experience greater difficulty than Christian ones in entering the British, Dutch and 
German labour markets.4 While Muslims were already viewed more negatively than 
most other minorities in the late 1990s, islamophobia has been periodically reinforced in 
the post-9/11 era by a series of highly mediatised terrorist attacks, urban riots and 
international controversies on the limits of free speech and religious criticism. 5 
Reflecting and feeding these tensions, political discourses regularly portray Islam as a 
                                                        
1  Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation; Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 
2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. 
2 Fundamental Rights Agency, EU-MIDS Data in Focus Report 2: Muslims (2009), p. 12. 
3  European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Muslims in the European Union: 
Discrimination and Islamophobia (2006). 
4 Koenig, Matthias, Maliepaard, Mieke & Güveli, Ayse, “Religion and new immigrants’ labor market 
entry in Western Europe”, Ethnicities 16 (2016), pp. 213-235. 
5 Strabac, Zan & Listhaug, Ola, “Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Europe: A Multilevel Analysis of Survey Data 
from 30 countries”, Social Science Research, 37 (2008), pp. 268-286; Bleich, Eric, “Where do Muslims 
stand on ethno-racial hierarchies in Britain and France? Evidence from public opinion surveys, 1988-
2008”, Patterns of Prejudice, 43 (2009) pp. 379-400; Spruyt, Bram & Elchardus, Mark, “Are anti-
Muslim feelings more widespread than anti-foreigner feelings? Evidence from two split-sample 
experiments”, Ethnicities 12 (2012), pp. 800-820; Savelkoul, Michael, Scheepers, Peer, Van der Veld, 
William & Hagendoorn, Louk, “Comparing levels of anti-Muslim attitudes across Western countries”, 
Quality & Quantity 46 (2012), pp. 1617-1624. For evidence against the unique stigmatisation of Muslim 
immigrants, see Strabac, Zan, Aalberg, Toril & Valenta, Marko, “Attitudes towards Muslim immigrants: 
Evidence from survey experiments across four countries”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40 
(2014), pp. 100-118. 
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threat for Western civilisation and values6, a rhetoric that has boosted the popularity of 
far-right parties throughout Europe.7 To reassure their voters, centrist governments have 
undertaken to tighten cultural requirements in citizenship procedures, restrict family 
reunion, curb mosque construction, monitor imams and step up searches and detentions 
of suspected terrorists.8 Paradoxically, such measures may increase long-term insecurity 
by further alienating their implicit or explicit targets.9 
 In the midst of this hostile climate, Muslims have increasingly sought to avail 
themselves of the protection offered by international human rights law,10 including the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), whose Articles 9 and 14 respectively 
enshrine their right to freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination in the 
enjoyment of all rights. 11  A number of recent trends in the jurisprudence of the 
                                                        
6 Ekman, Mattias, “Online islamophobia and the politics of fear”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 38 (2015), 
pp. 1986-2002; Alexander, Jeffrey, “Struggling over the mode of incorporation: Backlash against 
multiculturalism in Europe”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 1-26; Cesari, Jocelyne, Why the West Fears 
Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013); 
Modood, Tariq & Triandafyllidou, Anna, Multiculturalism, Muslims and citizenship: A European 
approach (London: Routledge, 2006). 
7 Hafez, Farid, “Shifting borders: Islamophobia as common ground for building pan-European right-wing 
unity”, Patterns of Prejudice 48 (2014), pp. 479-499; Allen, Christopher, Islamophobia (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2010) pp. 109 ff; Aalberg, Toril et. al., Populist political communication in Europe (London: 
Routledge, 2017); Kutay, Acar, “Dominant pluralism and discursive strategies of contemporary racism 
against Muslim minorities in Europe”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 35 (2015), pp. 1-16. 
8 Fekete, Liz, A Suitable Enemy: Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe (London: Pluto Press, 
2009), pp. 43-76; Erik Bleich, “State responses to ‘Muslim’ violence: A comparison of six Western 
European countries”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35 (2009), pp. 361-379; Burchardt, Marian 
& Michalowski, Ines (eds.), After integration: Islam, conviviality and contentious politics in Europe 
(Springer, 2015). 
9 Fleischmann, Fenella, Phalet, Karen & Klein, Olivier, “Religious identification and politicization in the 
face of discrimination: Support for political Islam and political action among the Turkish and Moroccan 
second generation in Europe”, British Journal of Social Psychology 50 (2011), pp. 628-648; Kunst, Jonas, 
Tajamal, Hajra, Sam, David & Ulleberg, Pal, “Coping with Islamophobia: The effects of religious stigma 
on Muslim minorities’ identity formation”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations 36 (2012), pp. 
518-532; Saffron Karlsen and James Nazroo, “Influences on forms of national identity and feeling ‘at 
home’ among Muslim groups in Britain, Germany and Spain”, Ethnicities, 13 (2013) pp. 689-708; 
Yasmin Hussain and Paul Bagguley, “Funny looks: British Pakistanis’ experiences after 7 July 2005”, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36 (2013), pp. 28-46. 
10 Edmunds, June, “The ‘new’ barbarians: governmentality, securitization and Islam in Western Europe”, 
Contemporary Islam, 6 (2012), pp. 67-84. 
11 Article 9: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.” Article 
14: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” 
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) suggest that this strategy might come to 
bear fruits. Regarding Article 14, the requirement that a discriminatory act 
simultaneously affect another Convention right in order to trigger judicial review has 
been relaxed, relieving the non-discrimination provision of its redundant character. At 
the same time, a more context-sensitive approach to the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination has allowed the Court to exercise stricter scrutiny when state action 
exacerbates the subordination of a symbolically and materially disadvantaged social 
category. This has allowed general rules to be characterised as indirect discrimination.12 
In situations of inter-religious tension, the Court has held that states should not attempt 
to erase pluralism but to foster mutual respect.13 Moreover, it has summoned them to 
strive toward religious neutrality, possibly implying a duty of equidistance from 
majority and minority faiths.14 
 Notwithstanding these promising developments, there also remain signs that the 
Court is failing to tackle, and perhaps entrenching, anti-Muslim biases. In particular, its 
decisions have been criticised for drawing a sharp distinction between the absolute right 
to hold a religious belief and the much more qualified right to manifest it, 15  for 
accepting the notion that Islamic veils threaten public order, conviviality and gender 
                                                        
12 Fredman, Sandra, “Emerging from the shadows: Substantive equality and Article 14 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights”, Human Rights Law Review 16 (2016), pp. 273-301; Anardóttir, Oddny 
Mjöll, “The Differences that Make a Difference: Recent Developments on the Discrimination Grounds 
and the Margin of Appreciation under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, Human 
Rights Law Review (2014), pp. 1-24; Danisi, Carmelo, “How far can the European Court of Human 
Rights go in the fight against discrimination? Defining new standards in its nondiscrimination 
jurisprudence”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 9 (2011), pp. 793-807; O’Connell, Rory, 
“Cinderella comes to the Ball: Art 14 and the right to non-discrimination in the ECHR”, Legal Studies 29 
(2009), pp. 211-229. 
13  Leigh, Ian, “New Trends in Religious Liberty and the European Court of Human Rights”, 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 12 (2010), pp. 266-279. 
14 Leigh, Ian & Ahdar, Rex, “Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God 
Never Really Went Away”, The Modern Law Review 75 (2012), pp. 1064-1098; Leigh, Ian, New Trends 
in Religious Liberty. 
15 Demir Gürsel, Esra, “The Distinction Between the Freedom of Religion and the Right to Manifest 
Religion: A Legal Medium to Regulate Subjectivities”, Social & Legal Studies 22 (2013), pp. 377-393; 
Bratza, Nicolas, “The ‘Precious Asset’: Freedom of Religion Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, Ecclesiastical Law Journal 14 (2012), pp. 256-261. 
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equality16 and for simultaneously allowing the establishment of dominant religions17 
and the strict regulation of minority faiths.18 In turn, many of these trends seem rooted 
in a conservative approach to the regulation of state-religion relations, a potential 
minefield for the Court’s legitimacy. 19  Taking stock of such shortcomings, some 
scholars have concluded that judicial litigation may be counter-productive and 
advocated other types of mobilisation.20 
  This article seeks to build on and systematise such insights in order to 
distinguish the specific standards that have curtailed the Court’s ability to counter 
discrimination against Muslims and signal concrete ways of overcoming them. By 
exploring the interplay between judicial decisions, public policies and social attitudes, it 
inscribes itself within a dynamic stream of research examining the institutional factors 
                                                        
16 Bleiberg, Benjamin D., “Unveiling the Real Issue: Evaluating the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Decision to Enforce the Turkish Headscarf Ban in Leyla Sahin v Turkey”, Cornell Law Review 91 (2005), 
pp. 164-169; Solanes Corella, Ángeles, “Conflictos derivados del uso del velo integral en Europa: 
Prohibiciones y gestión de la vida en común”, in Solanes Corella, Ángeles (ed.), Diversidad cultural y 
conflictos en la Unión Europea. Implicaciones jurídico-políticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2015); 
Bosset, Pierre, “Mainstreaming religious diversity in a secular and egalitarian state: The road(s) not taken 
in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey”, in Eva Brems (ed.), Diversity and European human rights: Rewriting 
judgments of the ECHR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
17  Kyritsis, Dimitrios & Stavros Tsakyrakis, “Neutrality in the classroom”, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 11 (2013), pp. 200-217; Henrard, Kristin, “A Critical Appraisal of the Margin of 
Appreciation Left to States Pertaining to Church–State Relations”, in A Test of Faith? Religious Diversity 
and Accommodation in the European Workplace, Katayoun Alidadi, Marie-Claire Foblets & Jogchum 
Vrielink (eds.) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 59-86; Evans, Caroline & Chris Thomas, “Church-State 
Relations in the European Court of Human Rights”, Brigham Young University Law Review 3 (2006), pp. 
53-62. 
18 Cebada Romero, Alicia, “The European Court of Human Rights and Religion: Between Christian 
Neutrality and the Fear of Islam”, The New Zeland Journal of Public and International Law 11 (2013), 
pp. 75-102; Danchin, Peter G., “Islam in the secular nomos of the European Court of Human Rights”, 
Michigan Journal of International Law 32 (2011), pp. 663-747; Bleiberg, Benjamin D., “Unveiling the 
Real Issue: Evaluating the European Court of Human Rights’ Decision to Enforce the Turkish Headscarf 
Ban in Leyla Sahin v Turkey”, Cornell Law Review 91 (2005), pp. 151-156. 
19 Ronchi, Paolo, “Crucifixes, Margin of Appreciation and Consensus: The Grand Chamber Ruling in 
Lautsi v Italy”, Ecclesiastical Law Journal 13 (2011), pp. 287-297; Mancini, Susanna, “The Crucifix 
Rage: Supranational Constitutionalism Bumps Against the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty”, European 
Constitutional Law Review 6 (2010), pp. 6-27; Itzcovitch, Giulio, “One, None and One Hundred 
Thousand Margins of Appreciation: The Lautsi Case”, Human Rights Law Review 13 (2013), pp. 287-
308. 
20 June Edmunds, “The limits of post-national citizenship: European Muslims, human rights and the 
hijab”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 35 (2012), pp. 1181-1199; Neus Torbisco Casals, ‘Identity conflicts, 
human rights and the crisis of multiculturalism in Europe: From politics to the courts’, GRITIM-UPF 
Working Paper Series 21 (2014), pp. 1-52. 
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behind the construction of Muslim identities.21 Three aspects of the Court’s case law 
will be discussed in turn: the endorsement of discriminatory policies toward non-
Christians; the validation of discourses that securitise Islam by opposing it to human 
rights, democracy and gender equality; and the legitimation of an exclusive secularism 
that forces the concealment of Muslim and other minority identities, thus hindering their 
normalisation. In the final section, these patterns will be used to identify legal reforms 
that could enhance the Court’s future contribution to the emancipation of European 
Muslims. 
 
The endorsement of institutional discrimination 
Despite the relative independence of political and religious authorities that characterises 
contemporary European states, the predominance of their Christian heritage remains 
clearly visible in a number of constitutions, education and health systems, social 
services, fiscal arrangements, official symbols, place names, holidays, buildings, 
protocols and historical sites, cultural institutions and so on.22 This asymmetry places a 
special burden on religious minorities to adapt their customs to laws and regulations 
designed to serve the needs of a Christian population.23 Perhaps more importantly, it 
also has the symbolic effect of inscribing Christianity as an implicit norm of belonging 
to the political community. 24  According to social psychological research, national 
identities provide significant normative references on which individuals draw in order to 
                                                        
21 Bowen, John, Bertossi, Christophe, Duyvendak, Jan Willem and Krook, Mona Lena, (eds.), European 
states and their Muslim citizens: The impact of institutions on perceptions and boundaries (New York: 
Cambridge, 2014);  Anna Triandafyllidou (ed.), Muslims in 21st Century Europe: Structural and cultural 
perspectives (London: Routledge, 2010). 
22 Schanda, Balász (ed.), The mutual roles of religion and state in Europe (Trier: Institute for European 
Constitutional Law, 2014). 
23 Foblets, Marie-Claire & Alidadi, Katayoun, “The RELIGARE report: Religion in the context of the 
European Union: Engaging the interplay between religious diversity and secular models” in Foblets, 
Marie-Claire, Alidadi, Katayoun, Nielsen, Jorgen & Yanasmayan, Zeynep (eds.), Belief, law and politics: 
What future for a secular Europe? (Farnhan: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 11-54. 
24 For a theoretical discussion on the intertwinning of national and religious identities, see Brubaker, 
Rogers, “Religion and nationalism: four approaches”, Nations and Nationalism 18 (2012), pp. 2-20. 
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evaluate themselves and others. Because of this, nationally prototypical traits are 
usually perceived more favourably than atypical ones.25 If this is correct, Muslims are 
likely to remain stigmatised as long as the national culture is conceived as closely 
linked to the Christian tradition. Consistent with these predictions, a recent Dutch study 
has found that opposition to Muslim immigrants’ expressive rights was higher among 
respondents who perceived Christianity as an important part of their historical 
heritage.26 
 Entrusted with a mandate to uphold religious equality, human rights bodies can 
guide states through the on-going process of adapting their model of religious 
governance in order to accommodate Muslims and other minorities.27 However, two 
interpretive standards developed by the ECtHR have often led it to relinquish this role. 
On the one hand, the Court usually grants states a “margin of appreciation” (or 
discretion) when determining the content of fundamental rights, a margin that widens in 
proportion to the heterogeneity of existing policies.28 This doctrine, which has been 
formally incorporated in a 2013 amendment to the Convention,29 results in heightened 
deference to political decisions and reduced protection of individual claimants. On the 
other hand, and despite recent progress, there remains a tendency to interpret Article 14 
as a mere reiteration of rights’ universal character. This unwillingness to recognise the 
specificity of identity-based collective harms leads to the frequent rejection of 
discrimination claims on the grounds that Article 14 only comes into play when some 
                                                        
25 Wenzel, Michael, Amélie Mummendey & Sven Waldzus, “Superordinate identities and intergroup 
conflict: The ingroup projection model”, European Review of Social Psychology 18 (2007), pp. 331-372. 
26 Smeekes, Anouk and Verkuyten, Maykel, “When national culture is disrupted: Cultural continuity and 
resistence to Muslim immigrants”, Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 17 (2014), pp. 45-66. 
27 Laurence, Jonathan, The emancipation of Europe’s Muslim: The state’s role in minority integration 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2012). 
28 Letsas, George, “Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26 
(2006), pp. 705-732; Kratochvíl, Jan, “The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the European Court 
of Human Rights”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 29 (2011), pp. 324-357. 
29  Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (2013). 
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other (substantive) right has been violated – in which case it is also dismissed as 
redundant. 
 The way in which these standards have enabled the endorsement of institutional 
discrimination against non-Christians can be seen in decisions on the regulation of 
blasphemy and the teaching of religion in public schools. In 1991, following the 
publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, the Court was called upon to rule on 
the admissibility of a claim against the United Kingdom.30 The British Muslim litigant 
had seen his blasphemy suit rejected by domestic courts on the grounds that blasphemy 
laws only protected Christian beliefs. Against the objection that the limitation was 
anomalous and unjust, British courts argued that it was up to the legislature rather than 
the judiciary to modify unequivocal norms. In Strasbourg, the claimant accused the 
United Kingdom of denying him equal protection of the right to religious freedom, 
relying on ECHR Articles 9 and 14. Circumventing the discriminatory nature of British 
blasphemy laws, the Court ruled that the right to religious freedom did not include the 
protection of religious feelings. Absent a substantive violation, Article 14 did not apply. 
 This state of affairs was confirmed five years later in Wingrove v United 
Kingdom,31 which showed that the blasphemy offence was not on the verge of being 
abolished as suggested in the previous case.32 Invoking freedom of expression, a British 
movie director contested the censure of a short film on a nun’s erotic fantasy. Among 
other arguments, the litigant maintained that the ban was based on a law that 
discriminated against non-Christian faiths and thus could not pursue a legitimate aim. 
Despite recognising the discrimination, the Court ruled it was beyond its mandate to 
                                                        
30 Abdal Choudhury v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17439/90, Eur. Com. H.R. (1991). 
31 Wingrove v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996). 
32 The ECtHR also endorsed blasphemy laws in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No.  13470/87, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994), and I.A. v. Turkey, App. No. 42571/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). 
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carry out an abstract assessment of a statute’s compatibility with the Convention and 
upheld the ban. 
  Unlike blasphemy laws, whose enforcement has become relatively exceptional 
in Europe, state-sponsored confessional instruction remains widespread. While 
international law allows it as long as it includes an opt-out provision for students or 
parents who make the request, the practical difficulties involved in the implementation 
of such exemptions cast doubts on the possibility of making confessional education in 
public schools truly non-discriminatory.33 An opportunity of normative guidance in this 
field was provided by the case of Folgerø and others v Norway,34  pertaining to a 
compulsory subject on Christianity, religion and philosophy in primary and secondary 
education. Official guidelines described its aim as the acquisition of “thorough” 
knowledge on the Bible, Christianity and the Evangelical Lutheran faith, as well as 
“general” knowledge on other religions and philosophies. Three out of five modules 
focused on Christianity, whereas the fourth encompassed several other large religions 
(Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, together with the “secular orientation”) and the 
fifth dealt with ethical and philosophical awareness. 35  Parents could ask for their 
children to be exempted from specific activities that implied a personal adherence to the 
Christian faith, such as learning and reciting prayers, creeds and religious 
commandments, singing hymns, attending rituals, visiting churches and performing 
biblical plays. However, total exemption from the subject had to be justified and granted 
on an individual basis, for the state could not recognise a “right to ignorance”. 
                                                        
33  Temperman, Jeroen, “State Neutrality in Public School Education: An Analysis of the Interplay 
Between the Neutrality Principle, the Right to Adequate Education, Children’s Right to Freedom of 
Religion or Belief, Parental Liberties, and the Position of Teachers”, Human Rights Quarterly 32 (2010), 
pp. 879-881. 
34 Folgerø and Others v. Norway, App. No. 15472/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007). 
35 Id. ¶ 48-49. 
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 After unsuccessfully applying for such an exemption, five non-religious parents 
brought a complaint for the violation of their rights to private and family life (Article 8 
ECHR), religious freedom, non-discrimination and the education of children according 
to their parents’ convictions (Article 2 of ECHR additional protocol). In particular, they 
submitted that the predominance of Christian contents and the impossibility of drawing 
a clear line between indoctrination and the transmission of objective knowledge meant 
that partial exemptions exposed students to stigmatisation and value conflicts. 
Moreover, non-Christian families were imposed a unique obligation to request and 
justify exemptions, a time consuming procedure that presupposed in-depth knowledge 
of the curriculum. 
 The Court ruled in favour of the claimants, but without resorting to Article 14 
and through a highly casuistic reasoning that left the legitimacy of compulsory religious 
subjects in primary and secondary schools unquestioned. On the one hand, it recognised 
that the quantitative and qualitative imbalance between Christian and non-Christian 
contents could hardly be reconciled with the objective of promoting inter-faith 
understanding, respect and dialogue.36 On the other hand, it cautiously concluded that 
the exemption procedure did not offer sufficient guarantees that parents’ right to 
educate their children according to their beliefs would be respected in practice. Along 
the way, it stressed that the heavy predominance of Christian contents (which reached a 
ratio of one to twelve) did not infringe the principles of pluralism and objectivity, 
considering the cultural importance of Christianity in Norway and the broad margin of 
appreciation states enjoyed in curricular matters.37 
 A similar approach was used in Lautsi and others v Italy, which also addressed 
the Christian bias of public schools. Like Folgerø, Lautsi arose from a complaint by 
                                                        
36 Id. ¶ 90-95. 
37 Id. ¶ 89. 
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non-religious parents, but the contested policy consisted in a century-old prescription to 
display a cross in all public classrooms. At trial, the Second Section of the Court found 
a violation of Article 2 Protocol no. 1 in conjunction with Article 9, arguing that the 
cross violated children’s “negative” freedom of religion (namely, freedom from 
exposure to religion) and could cause emotional disturbance. 38  Following its usual 
practice, however, it did not consider it necessary to assess the case from a non-
discrimination perspective. The highly controversial decision was appealed by the 
Italian government, supported by Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Russia, Greece, 
Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, Romania and San Marino. Based on a detailed review of 
European policies regarding religious symbols, the Grand Chamber overturned the 
ruling on the grounds that the lack of consensus in this area made it necessary to grant 
states a wide margin of appreciation.39  Moreover, the cross was characterised as a 
“passive” symbol that differed from “active” forms of indoctrination.40 Article 14 was 
once more set aside since there was no violation of a substantive right. 
 Apart from the Court’s radical turnaround, reinforced by the near-unanimity of 
both decisions, one of Lautsi’s most interesting features is the way in which it revealed 
the thin line judges tread when coming to grips with rights-impinging but deeply rooted 
traditions. The frailty of their political support was bluntly underscored in a submission 
by 33 members of the European Parliament stating that the Court lacked constitutional 
legitimacy and should avoid sending a “radical ideological message”.41 By implicitly 
calling judges’ credibility into question and threatening incompliance with their 
decisions, such statements are likely to hinder the development of transformative 
jurisprudence in the area of religious equality. 
                                                        
38 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009). 
39 Lautsi and Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) ¶ 70. 
40 Id. ¶ 72. 
41 Id. ¶ 56. 
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The securitisation of Islam 
According to recent surveys, one of the main drivers of negative attitudes toward Islam 
is a widespread belief in its radical incompatibility with fundamental rights42 and the 
associated perception that it poses a threat to cherished ways of life and values.43 To the 
extent that judicial bodies are endowed with the authority for defining human rights and 
that their opinions are widely read and cited among legislators, journalists and other 
opinion-makers,44 the ECtHR’s opinion on their relationship with Islamic precepts can 
be expect to exert significant influence on public perceptions. For this reason, it has 
been suggested that the Court should systematically identify and counter the 
stereotypical justifications put forward by states in order to circumvent their Convention 
obligations, rejecting those that lack sufficient factual basis.45 Instead of this, Strasbourg 
judges have often incorporated them into their own reasoning, indirectly ratifying their 
validity. The paradoxical result has been to invoke the putative chasm between Islam 
and human rights in order to restrict the human rights of Muslims. 
 These problems have arisen in a series of complaints against Turkey, where 
elected representatives have long been subjected to the strict supervision of a national-
secularist alliance of military, judicial and bureaucratic elites. Apart from full-blown 
coups, these have repeatedly been involved in the dissolution of political parties that 
opposed their conception of the Republic.46 In three consecutive sentences of the late 
                                                        
42 Elchardus, Mark & Bram Spruyt, “Universalism and anti-Muslim sentiment”, International Journal of 
Intercultural Relations 38 (2014), pp. 75-85; Imhoff, Roland & Julia Recker, “Differentiating 
Islamophobia: Introducing a New Scale to Measure Islamoprejudice and Secular Islam Critique”, 
Political Psychology 33 (2012), pp. 811-824. 
43 Sniderman, Paul & Hagendoorn, Louk, When ways of life collide: Multiculturalism and its discontents 
in the Netherlands (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2007). 
44 Van Dijk, Teun, Elite discourse and racism (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993). 
45  Timmer, Alexandra, “Toward an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for the European Court of Human 
Rights”, Human Rights Law Review 11 (2011), pp. 707-738. 
46 Yavuz, Hakan, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009); Grigoriadis, Ioannis, “Islam and democratization in Turkey: secularism and trust in a divided 
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1990s, however, the ECtHR was unconvinced by their characterisation of Kurdish 
nationalism as a security threat47 and found political bans to be in violation of the right 
to freedom of assembly and association (Article 11 ECHR).48 The situation changed in 
2001, when it was called upon to rule on the dissolution of the Welfare Party (Refah). 
At the time of the facts, Refah held a third of parliamentary seats and had formed a 
governing coalition with centre-right forces.49 Unlike its predecessors, it had not been 
suppressed for its Kurdish allegiances but for carrying out “anti-secularist” activities. In 
particular, its president had been accused of supporting a lift of veil bans in universities, 
and some leaders had publicly advocated the islamisation of Turkish law.50 
 In Strasbourg, the Turkish government argued that secularism was a necessary 
precondition for the consolidation of liberal democracy in a post-theocratic state that 
faced the persisting threat of Islamist reactionaries. In its view, the rigorous defence of 
secularism explained why Turkey was the only Muslim society whose political system 
was based on the “Western model”.51 Abusive invocation of religious ideas by political 
representatives could endanger democracy, for political Islam had never displayed much 
tolerance toward its own believers. Its totalitarian tendencies, strategically concealed by 
its supporters until their seized power, transpired in their repeated efforts to bend state 
and community activities to religious precepts. In order to neutralise this threat, it was 
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necessary for the Turkish state to espouse a “militant” democratic system that allowed 
the repression of undemocratic political forces.52 
 Reiterating and arguably radicalising the claims of the Turkish government and 
Constitutional Court, the ECtHR asserted that “sharia, which faithfully reflects the 
dogmas and divine rules laid out by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as 
pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no 
place in it”. According to the Court, it was difficult for a party to declare its respect for 
democracy and human rights while supporting sharia, which intervened “in all spheres 
of private and public life” and clearly departed from Convention values.53 The Court 
concluded that notwithstanding the importance of democratic pluralism, championed in 
earlier cases of party dissolution, “a state may reasonably forestall the execution of such 
a policy, which is incompatible with the Convention’s provisions, before an attempt is 
made to implement it through concrete steps that might prejudice civil peace and the 
country’s democratic regime”.54 The verdict was upheld two years later by a unanimous 
Grand Chamber, which textually reproduced the Third Section’s opinion on sharia.55 
 While theological debates are beyond the remit of judicial bodies, the depiction 
of sharia as unified, invariable and antithetical to democracy and human rights does not 
seem to resist minimal scrutiny. Apart from ignoring the considerable variety of legal 
and political arrangements in predominantly Muslim countries56 and the hermeneutical 
innovations of contemporary theologians,57 it carelessly disregards the participation of 
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millions of Turkish Muslims in democratic processes and rights advocacy.58 Ironically, 
it also plays into the hands of religious extremists, who have the most to gain from the 
ideological opposition of Islam and democracy. 
 Immediately after the second Refah judgement, the Court was offered a new 
opportunity to assess Turkish arguments for restricting the rights of practising Muslims. 
Leyla Sahin, then a student of medicine at Istanbul University, 59  claimed that the 
prohibition on wearing her veil to class limited her right to manifest her religion in a 
way that could not be justified by public order, secularism or the rights of others.60 For 
one thing, she had no intention to question constitutional principles, including 
secularism, by using the veil. The garment could neither be construed as a form of 
ostentation, protest, provocation or proselytism, nor cause any disruption or threat to 
public order in higher-education institutions. In addition, the role of public authorities in 
contexts of religious tension was not to eliminate diversity but to foster tolerance. In its 
response, the Turkish government reaffirmed the difficulty of reconciling Islam and 
democracy and, consequently, the importance of protecting Turkish secularism.  
 Not only did the Court’s Fourth Section categorically reject the claimant’s 
interpretation of the veil but it also drew on earlier case law in order to expand, like in 
Refah, the defendant’s arguments. Citing Dahlab v Switzerland, it characterised the veil 
as a “powerful external symbol” with proselytising effects, imposed on women by 
Koranic precepts and difficult to reconcile with gender equality.61 Relying on Refah, it 
went on to assert that in pious Turkey, the prevention of fundamentalist pressures on 
students who did not practice the majority religion could justify limitations on religious 
freedom. In particular, rites and symbols could be regulated in order to ensure peaceful 
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co-existence and maintain public order. 62  Due to the threat of “extremist political 
movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious 
symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts”, universities could 
legitimately consider the veil contrary to the values of pluralism, respect for the rights 
of others and gender equality.63 Therefore, Article 9 had not been violated. 
 Despite the unanimous decision, Leyla Sahin appealed to the Court’s Grand 
Chamber in an attempt to debunk the Fourth Section’s stereotypical premises: the 
antagonism between Islam and democracy, the proselytising function of the veil, its 
necessarily imposed character and its incompatibility with gender equality. 64  The 
operation failed: after carefully registering these objections, the Grand Chamber largely 
confined itself to ratifying the previous sentence. However, all was not in vain. In a 
thoroughly argued dissenting opinion, judge Tulkens criticised the majority for 
unconditionally siding with the government’s account and, in particular, for 
misrepresenting the relationship between the veil, secularism and gender equality. 
Recalling that only proven facts could justify interference with a Convention right, she 
defended the need to draw a clear distinction between students who wore the veil and 
Islamists who sought to impose its use. Not all practising Muslims were extremists, and 
there was no indication that Leyla Sahin was one. As to the meaning of the veil, it was 
likely to vary from one person to the next. The applicant had declared she wore it on her 
own free will; in the absence of any contrasting evidence, the Court could not impose its 
own understanding of the situation.65 
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 The negative effects attributed to the veil in Leyla Sahin appear especially 
irrational in light of the second Lautsi judgement, where the Christian cross was finally 
allowed on the walls of all Italian classrooms. In the latter case, the Court also stressed 
the importance of religious neutrality, but it did not broach the possibility of any 
incompatibility between Christian precepts and democratic principles. On the contrary, 
it gave the benefit of doubt to the Italian government’s thesis that “beyond its religious 
meaning, the crucifix symbolises the principles and values which formed the foundation 
of democracy and Western civilisation”.66 The Court also underscored there was no 
evidence of the symbol’s negative repercussions on students. It is doubtful whether such 
empirical prudence would have prevailed if the cross had been replaced by a copy of the 
Koran. 
 
The concealment of Muslim identities 
Since Leyla Sahin, Strasbourg’s endorsement of veil bans has not only taken place in 
the context of a predominantly Muslim country like Turkey but also in majority 
Christian France, where the display of “conspicuous” signs of religious affiliation in 
public schools was outlawed in 2004. 67  According to a Ministry of Education 
memorandum,68 the ban aimed to foster the principles of secularism, individual liberty 
and gender equality that underpinned schools’ mission. In a reasoning that harked back 
to Strasbourg case law, the document explained that the law would protect the system 
from “communitarian demands” and shield pupils from “the pressures that could result 
from the conspicuous manifestation of religious affiliations”. After mentioning the 
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importance of eliminating all forms of discrimination, it went on to specify that the ban 
was limited to symbols that would lead to the immediate recognition of a faith, such as 
the veil, the kippa or a “manifestly oversized” cross. In apparent contradiction with the 
letter and spirit of religious freedom, it insisted that the religious significance of a 
garment could not be invoked in order to obtain an exemption from general dress codes. 
At the same time, it recalled that education professionals, “whatever their function and 
status, are bound by a strict duty of neutrality that impedes the use of any sign of 
religious affiliation, however discreet”. 
 The ECtHR resolved the first actions against the statute in 2009, in six 
simultaneous and nearly identical decisions. 69  The outcome was foreshadowed the 
previous year when it upheld the expulsion of two Muslim schoolgirls for refusing to 
take off their veil during physical education classes. The facts had taken place before 
the law on secularism was adopted, but the Court accepted en masse all the 
justifications put forward by educational authorities: the obligation for students to abide 
by health, safety and assiduity standards, their refusal to unveil when asked to, the 
unacceptability of the proposed alternative (replacing the veil with a hat), the principle 
of secularism, the prevention of peer pressure and the protection of public order.70 The 
novelty of the 2009 decisions, apart from the fact that two of them related to Sikh 
turbans, was that the contested prohibition applied to all classes taught in primary and 
secondary public schools. Because of this, the French government’s defence had to 
revolve exclusively around secularism and public order.  
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 The Court’s response was unequivocal. In all cases, it unanimously ruled out the 
admissibility of the claims. Even if the ban’s sole objective was to uphold secularism, 
this aim was compatible with Convention values. Moreover, expulsion was not a 
disproportionate sanction for non-compliance, since students could pursue their 
schooling in a private establishment, from home or by correspondence. As to the 
substitution of standard veils and turbans with more discreet variants, it was up to states 
to determine whether it resolved the problem of ostentation or merely amounted to an 
attempt to circumvent the rules. 
 Throughout its case law on the regulation of religious symbols, the ECtHR has 
adhered to an increasingly restrictive interpretation of the right to manifest religious 
beliefs. In Dahlab, the prohibition it endorsed only affected teachers; in Leyla Sahin, it 
was seen as stemming from a specifically Turkish threat of radical Islamism; in Dogru 
and Kervanci, it was linked to safety concerns in physical education. In the 2009 cases, 
however, the Court established that the mere invocation of secularism would suffice to 
justify interference. It also proved unwilling to require factual evidence of the 
“pressures” or “tensions” caused by such manifestations. Consciously or not, it thus 
paved the way for what could become a major long-term cause of islamophobia: the 
invisibility of Muslim identities. 
 As discussed above, Islam is widely perceived as extraneous to European and 
national identities and values. The result is that while religious people tend to reject the 
headscarf as an encroachment on Christian traditions, liberals oppose it as a symbol of 
authoritarianism and patriarchy. 71  However, there are at least two ways in which 
minority religious symbols could foster more harmonious inter-faith relations. The first 
is by substituting monolithic national identities with more complex ones that would 
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include multiple prototypes or subgroups.72 The second is by multiplying the attitudinal 
benefits of personalised interactions between Muslims and the rest of the population. 
During the last decades, prejudice research has not only confirmed the trust-building 
properties of cooperative contact73 but also the conditions under which it must take 
place for its impact to be maximised.74 One of these consists in increasing the salience 
of the stigmatised trait (in this case, religious affiliation) so as to elicit the perception 
that the individual being dealt with is representative of her social category. Failing this, 
any attitudinal improvement will likely remain limited to this single person, leaving the 
collective stereotype intact.75 
 Because of the crucial role played by educational institutions in youths’ identity 
construction and socialisation, 76  Strasbourg’s reluctance to counteract their forced 
homogenisation can be characterised as a missed opportunity for the early inculcation of 
inter-religious understanding. For all the claims of secularism, European states’ support 
for the activities of Christian organisations remains a universal fact.77 Even if it were 
somehow withdrawn, the ubiquitous imprint of Christianity on the continent’s cultural 
heritage would still make it impossible to balance the visibility of the different religions 
practised by its population. In such a context, redressing the symbolic status of Islam 
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and other minority religions would involve encouraging, rather than impeding, their 
adherents to leave their own mark on the European public space.78 
 
Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to identify the ways in which the ECtHR has 
been contributing, directly and indirectly, to the discrimination of Muslims in Europe. 
Given the significant influence of its case law on domestic courts and the cross-national 
challenge posed by the educational, economic and political inclusion of immigrants 
from majority Muslim countries, the implications of this analysis arguably go beyond 
academic concerns. However, its conclusions can also shed light on the fundamental 
dilemmas that tend to crop up when human rights bodies are asked to uphold equality in 
diverse societies. By signalling the blind spots of judicial reasoning, socio-legal 
analyses can simultaneously support the enrichment of jurisprudence, the consolidation 
of legal institutions and the effective targeting of strategic litigation.  
 First, the ECtHR has been extremely reluctant to invoke the prohibition of 
discrimination in order to sanction the less favourable treatment of non-Christians in 
state law and policy. Insofar as the problem lies in the restrictive wording of Article 14, 
a possible solution would be states’ adhesion to Protocol 12 ECHR, in force since 2005, 
which extends non-discrimination requirements to all measures taken by public 
authorities. The main obstacle to this course of action seems to be a lack of political 
will: fifteen years after its redaction, the Protocol has yet to be ratified by most Western 
European states. Another cause of Court restraint is that religious governance has 
generally been seen as falling within states’ margin of appreciation, hampering the 
development of minimal European standards. Admitting that the margin of appreciation 
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doctrine has a legitimate role to play in the activity of an international court, the serious 
issues at stake in the configuration of state-religion relations seem to warrant a 
significant narrowing of its scope. Without such a shift, the Court may inadvertently 
prop up the legitimacy of unjust institutions rather than promote their long-term 
transformation. Since it tends to grant states greater discretion in areas where policies 
diverge widely, the future results of domestic litigation and political mobilisation is 
likely produce important knock-on effects on its jurisprudence. 
 Secondly, the Court’s propensity to indulge in stereotypical reasoning has lent 
credibility to political and social discourses that stigmatise Islam by opposing it to 
human rights, democracy and gender equality. By definition, stereotypes are easily 
mistaken for obvious truths. Recommending that judges stop resorting to them may 
therefore be futile. This being said, various measures could be adopted to elicit a more 
critical stance toward sweeping statements on disadvantaged social categories. One of 
them is to provide guidance on the main targets of prejudice and underscore their 
special relevance for anti-discrimination provisions. In this respect, the current list of 
grounds offered in Article 14 could be completed with obviously missing ones such as 
sexual orientation, sexual identity, disability and age. Additionally, the ECHR preamble 
could emphasise the values of equality and respect for diversity that underpin the 
recognition of all fundamental rights. Finally, the Court’s rules of procedure could 
include a section on the treatment of religious and other differences. In line with the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, guidelines could characterise 
cultural diversity as a positive asset to be fostered and shared. In order to maximise their 
impact on the work of the Court, they could be taken into consideration in judge 
selection and training. 
  23 
 Finally, and despite its apparent benignity, the concealment of Muslim identities 
may very well turn out to be the most damaging side-effect of Strasbourg jurisprudence 
on religious freedom. By allowing far-reaching limitations on individuals’ right to 
manifest their faith, the Court has contributed to the erection of a thick wall between 
European identities and Islam, indirectly perpetuating social disrespect and mistrust. 
Among the multiple arguments mobilised in order to justify these restrictions, the 
defence of secularism has taken on an increasingly determining and autonomous 
character. This is somewhat puzzling, given the Court’s endorsement of a wide range of 
policies supporting majority religions. Be that as it may, the discriminatory 
consequences of an interpretation of secularism that forces Muslims into public 
invisibility could be invoked to reject its legitimacy. Stricter scrutiny could also be 
applied to other reasons for restricting the display of religious symbols, obliging them to 
pass the test of rationality as well as seriousness. 
